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Abstract Newman’s theorem states that we can take any public-coin communication
protocol and convert it into one that uses only private randomness with but a little
increase in communication complexity. We consider a reversed scenario in the context
of information complexity: can we take a protocol that uses private randomness and
convert it into one that only uses public randomness while preserving the information
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revealed to each player? We prove that the answer is yes, at least for protocols that use
a bounded number of rounds. As an application, we prove new direct-sum theorems
through the compression of interactive communication in the bounded-round setting.
To obtain this application, we prove a new one-shot variant of the Slepian–Wolf coding
theorem, interesting in its own right. Furthermore, we show that if a Reverse New-
man’s Theorem can be proven in full generality, then full compression of interactive
communication and fully-general direct-sum theorems will result.
Keywords Communication complexity · Information complexity · Information
theory · Compression · Slepian–Wolf
1 Introduction
Information cost was introduced by a series of papers [1,6,8,9,13] as a complexity
measure for two-player communication protocols. Internal information cost measures
the amount of information that each player learns about the input of the other player
while executing a given protocol. In the usual setting of communication complexity
we have two players, Alice and Bob, each having an input x and y, respectively.
Their goal is to determine the value f (x, y) for some predetermined function f . They
achieve the goal by communicating to each other some amount of information about
their inputs according to some protocol.
The usual measure considered in this setting is the number of bits exchanged by
Alice and Bob, whereas the internal information cost measures the amount of informa-
tion transferred between the players during the communication. Clearly, the amount
of information is upper bounded by the number of bits exchanged but not vice versa.
There might be a lengthy protocol (say even of exponential size) that reveals very little
information about the players’ inputs.
In recent years, a substantial research effort was devoted to proving the converse
relationship between the information cost and the length of protocols, i.e., to proving
that a protocol which reveals only I bits of information can be simulated by a dif-
ferent protocol which communicates only (roughly) I bits. Such results are known
as compression theorems. Barak et al. [1] prove that a protocol that communicates
C bits and has internal information cost I can be replaced by another protocol that
communicates O(
√
I · C logC) bits. For the case when the inputs of Alice and Bob
are sampled from independent distributions they also obtain a protocol that communi-
cates O(I · polylog C) bits. These conversions do not preserve the number of rounds.
In a follow up paper [6] consider a bounded round setting and give a technique that
converts the original q-round protocol into a protocol with O(q · log I ) rounds that
communicates O(I + q log q
ε
) bits with additional error ε.
All known compression theorems are in the randomized setting. We distinguish
two types of randomness—public and private. Public random bits are seen by both
communicating players, and both players can take actions based on these bits. Private
random bits are seen only by one of the parties, either Alice or Bob. We use public-
coin (private-coin) to denote protocols that use only public (private) randomness. If a
protocol uses both public and private randomness, we call it a mixed-coin protocol.
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Simulating a private-coin protocol using public randomness is straightforward:
Alice views a part of the public random bits as her private random bits, Bob does the
same using some other portion of the public bits, and they communicate according to
the original private-coin protocol. This new protocol communicates the same number
of bits as the original protocol and computes the same function. In the other direction,
an efficient simulation of a public-coin protocol using private randomness is provided
by Newman’s Theorem [16]. Sending over Alice’s private random bits to make them
public could in general be costly as they may need, e.g., polynomially many public
random bits, but Newman showed that it suffices for Alice to transfer only O(log n +
log 1
δ
) random bits to be able to simulate the original public-coin protocol, up to an
additional error of δ.
In the setting of information cost the situation is quite the opposite. Simulating
public randomness by private randomness is straightforward: one of the players sends
a part of his private random bits to the other player and then they run the original
protocol using these bits as the public randomness. Since the random bits contain no
information about either input, this simulation reveals no additional information about
the inputs; thus the information cost of the protocol stays the same. This is despite the
fact that the new protocol may communicate many more bits than the original one.
However, the conversion of a private-randomness protocol into a public-randomness
protocol seems significantly harder. For instance, consider a protocol in which in
the first round Alice sends to Bob her input x bit-wise XOR-ed with her private
randomness. Such a message does not reveal any information to Bob about Alice’s
input—as from Bob’s perspective he observes a random string—but were Alice to
reveal her private randomness to Bob, he would learn her complete input x . This
illustrates the difficulty in converting private randomness into public.
We will generally call “Reverse Newman’s Theorem” (RNT) a result that makes
randomness public in an interactive protocol without revealingmore information. This
paper is devoted to attacking the following:
RNT Question Can we take a private-coin protocol with information cost I and
convert it into a public-coin protocol with the same behavior and information
cost O˜(I )?
Interestingly, the known compression theorems [1,6,12] give compressed protocols
that use only public randomness, and hence as a by-product they give a conversion
of private-randomness protocols into public-randomness equivalents. However, the
parameters of this conversion are far from the desired ones.1 In Sect. 4 we show that
the RNT question represents the core difficulty in proving full compression theorems;
namely, we will prove that any public-coin protocol that reveals I bits of information
can already be compressed to a protocol that uses O˜(I ) bits of communication, and
hence a fully general RNT would result in fully general compression results, together
with the direct-sum results that would follow as a consequence. This was discovered
independently by Denis Pankratov, who in his MSc thesis [17] extended the analysis
of the [1] compression schemes to show that they achieve full compression in the
1 We discuss the differences in more detail in Sect. 5.
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case when only public randomness is used. Our compression scheme is similar but
slightly different: we discovered it originally while studying the compression problem
in a Kolmogorov complexity setting (as in [4]), and our proof for the Shannon setting
arises from the proper “translation” of this proof; we include it for completeness and
because we think it makes for a more elementary proof.
Main contributions Our main contribution is a Reverse Newman’s Theorem in
the bounded-round scenario. We will show that any q-round private-coin protocol
can be converted to an O(q)-round public-coin protocol that reveals only additional
O˜(q) bits of information (Theorem 1). Our techniques are new and interesting. Our
main technical tool is a conversion of one round private-randomness protocols into
one round public-randomness protocols. This conversion proceeds in two main steps.
After discretizing the protocol so that the private randomness is sampled uniformly
from some finite domain, we convert the protocol into what we call a 1–1 protocol,
which is a protocol having the property that for each input and each message there
is at most one choice of private random bits that will lead the players to send that
message. We show that such a conversion can be done without revealing too much
extra information. In the second step we take any 1–1 protocol and convert it into
a public-coin protocol while leaking only a small additional amount of information
about the input. This part relies on constructing special bipartite graphs that contain a
large matching between the right partition and any large subset of left vertices.
Furthermore, we will prove two compression results for public-randomness proto-
cols: a round-preserving compression scheme to be used in the bounded-round case,
and a general (not round-preserving) compression scheme which can be used with
a fully general RNT. Either of these protocols achieves much better parameters than
those currently available for general protocols (that make use of private randomness as
well as public). The round-preserving compression scheme is essentially a constant-
round average-case one-shot version of the Slepian–Wolf coding theorem [19], and is
interesting in its own right.
As a result of our RNT and our round-preserving compression scheme, we will get
a new compression result for general (mixed-coin) bounded-round protocols.Whereas
previous results for the bounded-round scenario [6] gave compression schemes with
communication complexity similar to our own result, their protocols were not round-
preserving. We prove that a q-round protocol that reveals I bits of information can be
compressed to an O(q)-round protocol that communicates O(I +1)+q log( qn
δ
) bits,
with additional error δ. As a consequence we will also improve the bounded-round
direct-sum theorem of [6].
Subsequent work Since the publication of the conference version of the paper [2],
the following papers have extended or made use of our results:
– Braverman et al. [7] have shown direct-product theorems for constant-round ran-
domized communication complexity, which is an improvement of our direct-sum
results.
– Braverman and Garg [3] have devised a shorter proof of a Reverse Newman’s
Theorem for constant-round protocols, and with tighter bounds. They show that a
private-coin single-round protocol revealing I bits of information can be made
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public-coin by revealing only log I additional bits (a better bound than our
O(log 2n) of Theorem 2).
– Kozachinsky [14] has shown a general Reverse Newman’s Theorem, proving that
a private-coin protocol revealing I bits of information and using C bits of com-
munication can be converted into a public-coin protocol revealing O(
√
I C) bits
of information. Together with our and (independently) Pankratov’s compression
result for general protocols (Theorem 3), this gives the best-known direct-sum
result for general protocols of (Braverman et al).
– Bauer et al. [5] show how to compress a protocol with internal entropy
Hint and worst-case communication C into a protocol with communication
( H
int
ε
)2 log logC incurring extra error ε; in the case of public-coin protocols, Hint
is exactly the information cost, and hence this gives an exponential improvement
for the dependence on C , compared to any of our schemes.
– Kozachinsky [15] has also provided a simpler proof of the one-shot Slepian–Wolf
theorem, with smaller constants.
Differences from the conference version The paper has been substantially altered
since its conference version.We provide a new lower bound on the degree of matching
graphs, and a lower bound against any improvement to our strategy for proving a single-
round Reverse Newman’s Theorem. Furthermore, besides improvements in overall
readability, the paper includes new proofs for:
– Theorem 7 (Constant-round average-case one-shot Slepian–Wolf), the proof in the
conference submission was wrong.
– Lemma 2 (Making protocols 1–1 without losing information), the new proof is
one-third the size and much simpler.
– Lemma 1 (Existence of matching graphs), we have a shorter, more elegant proof
with slightly worse bounds, that are nonetheless good enough for our applications.
Organization of the paper In Sect. 3 we discuss our Reverse Newman’s Theo-
rem. In Sect. 4 we will prove compression results. Section 5 will give applications
to direct-sum theorems. Finally, Sect. 6 is dedicated to showing alternatives to the
constructions we have presented, as well as bounds that prevent further improvement
to our techniques.
2 Preliminaries
We use capital letters to denote random variables, calligraphic letters to denote sets,
and lower-case letters to denote elements in the corresponding sets. So typically A
is a random variable distributed over the set A, and a is an element of A. We will
also use capital and lower-case letters to denote integers numbering or indexing certain
sequences.We use Δ
(
A, A′
)
to denote the statistical distance between the probability
distributions of two random variables A and A′:
Δ
(
A, A′
) = 1
2
∑
a∈A
∣∣Pr[A = a] − Pr[A′ = a]∣∣ .
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2.1 Information Theory
For a given probability random variable A distributed over the support A, its entropy
is
H(A) =
∑
a∈A
pa log
1
pa
,
where pa = Pr[A = a]. Given a second random variable B that has a joint distribution
with A, the conditional entropy H(A|B) equals
Eb∈B[H(A|B = b)].
In this paper, and when clear from the context, we denote a conditional distribution
A|B = b more succinctly by A|b.
Fact 1 If A has n possible outcomes then
H(A) ≤ log n.
Fact 2
H(A|B) ≤ H(A) ≤ H(A, B), H(A|B, C) ≤ H(A|C) ≤ H(A, B|C).
Fact 3
H(A, B) = H(A) + H(B|A), H(A, B|C) = H(A|C) + H(B|A, C).
We let I (A : B) [I (A : B|C)] denote the Shannon mutual information between A
and B (conditional to C):
I (A : B) = H(A) − H(A|B) = H(B) − H(B|A),
I (A : B|C) = H(A|C) − H(A|B, C) = H(B|C) − H(B|A, C).
Notice that the first inequality in Fact 2 does not apply to Shannon information:
I (A : B|C)maybe larger than I (A : B) (for instancewhenC = A+B for independent
A, B).
Fact 4 (Chain rule)
I (A1, . . . , Ak : B|C) = I (A1 : B|C) +
k∑
i=2
I (Ai : B|C, A1, . . . , Ai−1)
Here A1, . . . , Ak stands for a random variable in the set of k-tuples and Ai stands for
its i th projection.
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Fact 5 A and B are independent conditional toC (whichmeans thatwhatever outcome
c of C we fix, A and B become independent conditional to the event C = c) if and
only if I (A : B|C) = 0.
Fact 6 If A and B are independent conditional to D then
I (A : C |B, D) = I (A : BC |D) ≤ I (A : C |D).
Fact 7 If A and C are independent conditional to the pair B, D then
I (A : B, C |D) = I (A : B|D).
From Fano’s inequality the following easily follows:
Fact 8 For any two random variables A, B over the same universe U , it holds that
|H(A) − H(B)| ≤ log(|U |)Δ(A, B) + 1,
2.2 Two-Player Protocols
We will be dealing with protocols that have both public and private randomness; this
is not very common, so we will give the full definitions, which are essentially those of
[1,6].Wewill be working exclusively in the distributional setting. From here onwards,
we will assume that the input is given to two players, Alice and Bob, by way of two
random variables X, Y sampled from a possibly correlated distribution μ over the
support X × Y .
A private-coin protocol π with output set Z is defined as a rooted tree, called the
protocol tree, in the following way:
1. Each non-leaf node is owned by either Alice or Bob.
2. If v is a non-leaf node belonging to Alice, then:
(a) The children of v are owned by Bob; each child is labeled with a binary string,
and the set C(v) of labels of v’s children is prefix-free.
(b) Associated with v is a set Rv , and a function Mv : X × Rv → C(v).
3. The situation is analogous for Bob’s nodes.
4. With each leaf we associate an output value in Z .
On input x, y the protocol is executed as follows:
1. Set v to be the root of the protocol tree.
2. If v is a leaf, the protocol ends and outputs the value associated with v.
3. If v is owned by Alice, she picks a string r uniformly at random from Rv and
sends the label of Mv(x, r) to Bob, they both set v := Mv(x, r), and return to the
previous step. Bob proceeds analogously on the nodes he owns.
A general, or mixed-coin, protocol is given by a distribution over private-coin pro-
tocols. The players run such a protocol by using shared randomness to pick an index r
(independently of X andY ) and then executing the corresponding private-coin protocol
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πr . A protocol is called public-coin if every Rv has size 1, i.e., no private randomness
is used.
We let π(x, y, r, rA, rB) denote the messages exchanged during the execution of π ,
for given inputs x, y, and random choices r, rA and rB , and Outπ (x, y, r, rA, rB) be
the output of π for said execution. The random variable R is the public randomness,
RA is Alice’s private randomness, and RB is Bob’s private randomness; we use Π to
denote the randomvariableπ(X, Y, R, RA, RB).We assumewithout loss of generality
that R, RA, and RB are uniformly distributed.
Definition 1 The worst-case communication complexity of a protocol π , CC(π), is
the maximum number of bits that can be transmitted in a run of π on any given input
and choice of random strings. The average communication complexity of a protocol π ,
with respect to the input distribution μ, denoted ACCμ(π), is the average number of
bits that are transmitted in an execution of π , for inputs drawn fromμ. The worst-case
number of rounds of π , RC(π), is the maximum depth reached in the protocol tree by
a run of π on any given input. The average number of rounds of π , w.r.t. μ, denoted
ARCμ(π), is the average depth reached in the protocol tree by an execution of π on
input distribution μ.
Definition 2 The (internal) information cost of protocol π with respect to μ is:
ICμ(π) = I (Y : Π, R, RA|X) + I (X : Π, R, RB |Y )
Here the term I (Y : R,Π, RA|X) stands for the amount of information Alice learns
about Bob’s input after the execution of the protocol (and the meaning of the second
term is similar). This term can be re-written in several different ways:
I (Y : Π, R, RA|X) = I (Y : Π |X, R, RA) = I (Y : Π, R|X, RA),
I (Y : Π, R, RA|X) = I (Y : Π, R|X) = I (Y : Π |X, R).
Here the first equality holds, as Bob’s input Y is independent from randomness R, RA
conditional to X , which is obvious (see Fact 6 from the preliminaries). The second
equality holds, sinceY is independent from randomness R conditional to X, RA, which
is also obvious.
The third equality holds, as Y is independent from RA conditional to Π, X, R
(Fact 7). This independence follows from the rectangle property of protocols: for
every fixed Π, X, R the set of all pairs ((Y, RB), RA) producing the transcript Π is a
rectangle and thus the pair (Y, RB) (and hence Y ) is independent from RA conditional
to Π, X, R. The fourth equality is proven similarly to the first and the second ones.
The expressions I (Y : Π, R|X) and I (Y : Π |X, R) for the information revealed to
Alice are the most convenient ones and we will use them throughout the paper. Similar
transformations can be applied to the second term in Definition 2.
Definition 3 A protocol π is said to compute function f : X × Y → Z with error
probability ε over distribution μ if
Pr
μ,R,RA,RB
[Outπ (x, y, r, rA, rB) = f (x, y)] ≥ 1 − ε .
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Many of our technical results require that the protocol uses a limited amount of
randomness at each step. This should not be surprising—this is also a requirement of
Newman’s theorem. This motivates the following definition.
Definition 4 A protocol π is an -discrete protocol2 if |Rv| = 2 at every node of
the protocol tree.
When a protocol is -discrete,we say that it uses bits of randomness for eachmessage;
when  is clear from context, we omit it. While the standard communication model
allows players to use an infinite amount of randomness at each step, this is almost
never an issue, since one may always “round the message probabilities” to a finite
precision. This intuition is captured in the following observation.
Observation 1 Suppose π is a private-coin protocol. Then, there exists an -discrete
protocolπ ′ with  = O(log(|X |)+log(|Y|)+CC(π)) such that (i)CC(π ′) ≤ CC(π),
(ii) RC(π ′) ≤ RC(π), and (iii) for all x, y we have
Δ
(
Π ′(x, y, RA, RB),Π(x, y, RA, RB)
) ≤ 2−Ω().
Furthermore, for any input distribution μ, the error of π ′ is at most the error of π
plus 2−. Equally small differences hold between ACCμ(π ′), ARCμ(π ′), and their π
equivalents, and ICμ(π ′) is within an additive constant of ICμ(π).
Hence, while working exclusively with discretized protocols, our theorems will
also hold for non-discretized protocols, except with an additional exponentially small
error term. We consider this error negligible, and hence avoid discussing it beyond
this point; the reader should bear in mind, though, that when we say that we are able
to simulate a discretized protocol exactly, this will imply that we can simulate any
protocol with sub-inverse-exponential 2−Ω() error.
We are particularly interested in the case of one-way protocols, where Alice sends
a single message to Bob. A one-way protocol π is given by a function Mπ : X ×R →
M; on input x Alice randomly generates r and sends Mπ (x, r). Note that if π is
private-coin, then ICμ(π) = I (X : M(X, RA)|Y ), and similarly, if π is public-coin,
then ICμ(π) = I (X : R, M(X, R)|Y ).
Finally, we close this section with a further restriction on protocols, which we call
1–1. Proving an RNT result for 1–1 protocols will be a useful intermediate step in the
general RNT proof.
Definition 5 A one-way protocol π is a 1–1 protocol if Mπ (x, ·) is 1–1 for all x .
3 Towards a Reverse Newman’s Theorem
Our main result is the following:
2 In a discrete protocol, we restrict only the amount of private randomness in this definition. It is perhaps
natural to also restrict the public randomness, but we will not need to.
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Theorem 1 (Reverse Newman’s Theorem, bounded-round version) Let π be an
arbitrary, -discrete, mixed-coin, q-round protocol, and let C = CC(π), n =
max{log |X |, log |Y|}. Suppose that π ’s public randomness R is chosen from the uni-
form distribution over the set R, and π ’s private randomness RA and RB is chosen
from uniform distributions over the sets RA and RB, respectively.
Then there exists a public-coin, q-round protocol π˜ , whose public randomness
R′ is drawn uniformly from R × RA × RB, and that has the exact same transcript
distribution, i.e., for any input pair x, y and any message transcript t ,
Pr[π(x, y, R, RA, RB) = t] = Pr[π˜(x, y, R′) = t],
and for any distribution μ giving the input (X, Y ),
ICμ(π˜) ≤ ICμ(π) + O (q log (2n)) . (1)
We conjecture, furthermore, that a fully general RNT holds:
Conjecture 1 Theorem 1 holds with (1) replaced by
ICμ(π˜) ≤ O˜(ICμ(π)),
where O˜(·) suppresses terms and factors logarithmic in ICμ(π) and CC(π).
In Sects. 4 and 5, we show that RNTs imply fully general compression of interactive
communication, and hence the resulting direct-sum theorems in information complex-
ity. This results in new compression and direct-sum theorems for the bounded-round
case. We believe that attacking Conjecture 1, perhaps with an improvement of our
techniques, is a sound and new approach to proving these theorems.
Before proving Theorem 1 let us first remark that it suffices to show it only for
protocols π without public randomness (with an absolute constant in the O-notation).
To see this, fix any outcome r of the random variable R, and look at the protocol π
conditioned on R = r . This is a protocol without public randomness, let us denote it
by πr . Using the expression
I (X : Π |Y, R) + I (Y : Π |X, R)
for information cost of π , we see that it equals the average information cost of the
protocol πr . Therefore, assuming that we are able to convert πr into a public-coin
protocol π˜r , as in Theorem 1, we can let the protocol π˜ pick a random r and then
run π˜r . As the information cost of the resulting protocol π˜ again equals the average
information cost of π˜r , the inequality (1) follows from similar inequalities for πr and
π˜r . For this reason, the theorems below will be proven for private-coin—rather than
mixed-coin—protocols.
As suggested by the O(q log(2n))-term of (1), Theorem 1 will be derived from
its one-way version.
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3.1 RNT for One-Way Protocols
Theorem 2 (RNT for one-way protocols) For any one-way private-coin -discrete
protocol π there exists a one-way public-coin -discrete protocol π ′ such that π and
π ′ generate the same message distributions, and for any input distribution (X, Y ) ∼ μ,
we have
ICμ(π ′) ≤ ICμ(π) + O(log(2n)),
where n = log |X |.
Proof We first sketch the proof. The public randomness R′ used by the new protocol
π ′ will be the very same randomness R used by π . So we seem to have very little
room for changing π , but actually there is one change that we are allowed to make.
Let Mπ : X × R → M be the function Alice uses to generate her message. It will
be helpful to think of Mπ as a table, with rows corresponding to possible inputs x ,
columns corresponding to possible choices of the private random string r , and the
(x, r) entry being the message Mπ (x, r). Noticing that r is picked uniformly, Alice
might instead sendmessage M(x, φx (r)), whereφx is some permutation ofR. In other
words, she may permute each row in the table using a permutation φx for the row x .
The permutation φx will “scramble” the formerly-private now-public randomness R
into some new string r˜ = φx (r) about which Bob hopefully knows nothing. This
“scrambling” keeps the message distribution exactly as it was, changing only which
R results in which message. We will see that this can be done in such a way that, in
spite of knowing r , Bob has no hope of knowing r˜ = φx (r), unless he already knows
x to begin with.
To understand what permutation φx we need, we first note the following. Let M ′ =
Mπ ′(X, R) denote the message that the protocol π ′ we have to design sends for input
X and public randomness R. Then the information cost of π ′ is
I (M ′, R : X |Y ).
The information cost of the original protocol π is
I (M : X |Y ) = I (M ′ : X |Y ),
where the equality holds as the distributions of the triples (M, X, Y ) and (M ′, X, Y )
are identical (regardless of the chosen permutations φx ). Thus the difference between
information costs of π ′ and π equals
I (M ′, R : X |Y ) − I (M ′ : X |Y ) = I (R : X |M ′, Y ),
which is at most H(R|M ′, Y ). If we permute each row of the table in such a way that
every message m appears in at most d = (n · )O(1) columns, then
H(R|M ′, Y ) = O(log n),
123
760 Algorithmica (2016) 76:749–781
as the entropy of any random variable with at most d outcomes does not exceed log d.
Unfortunately, it may happen that there are no such permutations. For instance, this is
the case when a row has the same message m in every column.
We will show that if this is not the case, and, moreover, each row has pairwise
different messages, then we can “almost” achieve the goal: one can permute each row
in such a way that with probability at least 1 − 1/n2 the message M ′ = Mπ ′(X, R)
appears in at most d = (n · )O(1) columns. Thus we first prove Theorem 2 for the
special case of 1–1 protocols, i.e. for protocols where each row has pairwise different
messages.
The proof of Theorem 2 for 1–1 protocols. We first will construct a special bipartite
graph G, which we call a matching graph. Its left nodes will be all possible messages
m and its right nodes will be all random strings r . Our strategy will be to find a way of
permuting each row of our table so that for every row x and most columns r (in row
x) the message Mπ ′(x, r) in the cell (x, r) of the table is connected by an edge to r in
the graph G.
Definition 6 An (m, , d, δ)-matching graph is a bipartite graph G = (M ∪ R, E)
such that |M| = 2m , |R| = 2, deg(u) = d for each u ∈ M, and such that for all
M′ ⊆ M with |M′| = 2, GM′∪R has a matching of size at least 2(1 − δ).
To gain some intuition about what is happening, suppose we had the following
fictional object: an (m, , n, 0)-matching graph—i.e., we have a degree-n graph with
the property that any left-set of size |R| will have a perfect matching with R that uses
only edges in the graph. Now let Mx = Mπ (x,R) be the set of messages that π can
send on input x ; then in the new protocol π ′, Mπ ′(x, r) is the message that is matched
with r in the perfect matching between Mx and R (see Fig. 1). It should be clear that
π ′ gives each message exactly the same probability mass.
To see that, in this new protocol π ′, R reveals little information about X when M ′
is known, notice that if we know the message m′ = Mπ ′(x, r), then in order to specify
r we only need to say which edge in the graph must be followed; this is specified with
log n bits because our graph has degree n. Hence I (X : R|M) ≤ H(R|M) ≤ log n.
In truth, matching graphs with such good parameters do not exist. But we can have
good-enough approximations, and we can show that this is enough for our purposes.
These graphs are obtained through the Probabilistic Method.
Lemma 1 For all integer  ≤ m and positive δ there is an (m, , d, δ)-matching graph
with d = O(m/δ).
In Sect. 6.1 we will show that the lemma holds also d = O((m − )/δ2) + ln(1/δ)/δ
(Lemma 10). That bound has better dependence onm,  (especially whenm−  m).
However, it has worse dependence on δ. In Sect. 6.2 we show a lower bound of
d = Ω((m − )/δ), which almost matches our upper bounds.
Proof Hall’s theorem [11] states that if in a bipartite graph every left subset of cardi-
nality i ≤ L has at least i neighbors then every left subset of cardinality i ≤ L has a
matching in the graph.
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Fig. 1 An ideal ‘matching graph’
Thus it suffices to construct a bipartite graph having this property for L = (1−δ)2.
By the union bound, a random graph3 of degree d fails to have this property with
probability at most
L∑
i=1
2mi2i
(
i/2
)di
.
Here 2mi is an upper bound for the number of i-element left subsets M′, 2i is an
upper bound for the number of i −1-element right subsetsR′, and (i/2)di is an upper
bound for the probability that all neighbors of M′ fall into R′. For L = (1− δ)2 this
sum is upper bounded by a geometric series
L∑
i=1
[
2m2(1 − δ)d
]i
.
Thus we are done, if the base of this series 2m2(1 − δ)d is less than 1/2, say, which
happens for d = O(m/δ). unionsq
Now the proof of Theorem 2 for 1–1 protocols proceeds as follows. Let n = log |X |
and  = log |R|. Assume without loss of generality thatM = M(X ,R); then |M| ≤
2n+. Now let G be an (n +, , d, δ)-matching graph having M as a subset of its left
set and R as its right set, for δ = 1
n2
. For these parameters, we are assured by Lemma
1 that such a matching graph exists having left-degree d = O((n + )n2).
3 For each left vertex, we pick each of the d neighbors independently and uniformly from the right-set.
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We construct the new protocolπ ′ as follows. For each x ∈ X letMx = M(x,R) be
the set of messages that might be sent on input x . Noticing that |Mx | = 2, consider
a partial G-matching between Mx and R pairing all but a δ-fraction of Mx ; then
define a bijection M ′x : R → Mx by setting M ′x (r) = m if (m, r) is an edge in the
matching, and pairing the unmatched m and r ’s arbitrarily (possibly using edges not
in G). Finally, set M ′(x, r) = M ′x (r).
Since M ′(x, r) = M ′x (r) for some bijection M ′x between R andMx , it is clear that
M and M ′ generate the same transcript distribution for any input x .
Nowweprove that M ′ does not revealmuchmore information than M .Wehave seen
that the difference between the information costs of π ′ and π is at most H(R|M ′, Y ).
Thus it suffices to show that H(R|M ′, Y ) is at most the logarithm of the left degree of
thematching graph plus a constant. As H(R|M ′, Y ) is the average of H(R|M ′, Y = y)
over all choices of y, it suffices to show that
H(R|M ′, Y = y) ≤ log d + 3
for every y.While proving this inequality, wewill drop the conditionY = y to simplify
notation.
Let us introduce a new random variable K , which is a function of X, R, M ′ and
takes the value 1 if (M ′, R) is an edge of thematching graph and is equal to 0 otherwise.
Recall that for every x the pair (M ′(x, R), R) is an edge of the matching graph with
probability at least 1 − 1/n2. Therefore, K = 0 with probability at most 1/n2. Call
a message m bad if the probability that K = 0 conditional to M ′ = m (that is, the
fraction of rows x , among all rows containing m, such that m was not matched within
the graph in the row x) is more than 1/n. Then M ′ is bad with probability less than
1/n, otherwise K = 0 would happen with probability greater than 1/n2.
The conditional entropy H(R|M ′) is the average of
H(R|M ′ = m)
over a randomly chosen m. Notice that H(R|M ′ = m) is at most the log-cardinality
of X , because in 1–1 protocols R is a function of the pair (M ′, X). Thus H(R|M ′ =
m) ≤ n for all m, and hence the total contribution of all bad m’s in H(R|M ′) is at
most 1. Thus it suffices to show that for all good m,
H(R|M ′ = m) ≤ log d + 2.
To this end notice that
H(R|M ′ = m) ≤ H(K |M ′ = m) + H(R|K , M ′ = m) ≤ 1 + H(R|K , M ′ = m).
Thus it is enough to prove that H(R|K , M ′ = m) ≤ log d + 1 for all good m. Again,
H(R|K , M ′ = m) can be represented as the weighted sum of two terms,
H(R|K = 1, M ′ = m) and H(R|K = 0, M ′ = m).
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The former term is at most log d, because when K = 1 and M ′ = m we can specify
R by the number of the edge (m, R) in the matching graph. The latter term is at most
n, however its weight is at most 1/n, since m is good. This completes the proof of
Theorem 2 for 1–1 protocols.
The proof of Theorem 2 in general case. The general case follows naturally from
1–1-case and the following lemma, which makes a protocol 1–1 by adding a small
amount of communication.
Lemma 2 (A 1–1 conversion which reveals little information) Given a one-round
-discrete private-coin protocol π , there is a one-round 1–1 -discrete private-coin
protocol π ′ whose message is of the form4
Mπ ′(x, r) = (Mπ (x, r), J (x, r)),
and such that, for any input distribution μ,
ICμ(π ′) ≤ ICμ(π) + log  + 1.
Proof We think of M(·, ·) as a table, where the inputs x ∈ X are the rows and the
random choices r ∈ R are the columns, and fix some ordering r1 < r2 < . . . of R.
The second part J (x, r) of Mπ ′ will be the ordinal number of the message M(x, r)
inside the row x i.e.,
J (x, r) = |{r ′ ≤ r |M(x, r ′) = M(x, r)}|.
This ensures that Mπ ′ is 1–1.
The difference between the information costs of π ′ and π is
I (M, J : X |Y ) − I (M : X |Y ) = I (J : X |Y, M).
Thus, it suffices to show that for every particular y, m we have5
I (J : X |Y = y, M = m) ≤ log  + 1. (2)
Fix any y and m, and drop the conditions Y = y, M = m to simplify the notation.
Obviously, I (J : X) = H(J ) − H(J |X). For any fixed x the random variable J has
the uniform distribution over the set {1, 2, . . . , Wx }, where Wx stands for the number
of occurrences of the message m in row x of the table.
Let us partition x’s into  classes so that if x is in the i th class then 2i−1 ≤ Wx < 2i .
Let Z = Z y,m be the class to which X belongs. Its entropy is at most log  and hence
4 On any input x and any choice of randomness r , Mπ ′ (x, r) is obtained by taking Mπ (x, r) and adding
some additional communication J (x, r).
5 In Sect. 6.3 we will prove a corresponding lower bound, implying that this upper-bound is tight up to a
constant term.
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we have
I (J : X) ≤ I (J : X |Z) + H(Z) ≤ I (J : X |Z) + log .
Thus it suffices to show that for every i we have
I (J : X |Z = i) ≤ 1.
Notice that
H(J |Z = i) ≤ i,
as for all x in i th class we have Wx ≤ 2i . On the other hand,
H(J |X, Z = i) ≥ i − 1,
as for every x in i th class we have Wx ≥ 2i−1 and the distribution of J conditional to
X = x, Y = y, M = m, Z = i is uniform. Thus
I (J : X |Z = i) = H(J |Z = i) − H(J |X, Z = i) ≤ i − (i − 1) = 1.
Now we are able to finish the proof of Theorem 2 in the general case. Suppose
π is a given one-way private-coin -discrete protocol. Let π2 be the 1–1 protocol
guaranteed by Lemma 2, and let π3 be the protocol constructed from π2 in the proof
of Theorem 2 for 1–1 case. Note that π3’s message is of the form Mπ3(X, R) =
(Mπ (X, R), J (X, R)), since it is equidistributed with Mπ2 . Furthermore, we have
ICμ(π3) ≤ ICμ(π) + O(log 2n).
Now, create a protocol π4, which is identical to π3, except that Alice omits J (X, R).
Since for each x the message Mπ4(x, r) sent by π4 equals M(x, φx (r)) for some
permutation φx ofR, it is clear that M and M ′ generate the same transcript distribution
for any input x . And, by the information-processing inequality,
ICμ(π4) ≤ ICμ(π3).
This completes the proof of Theorem 2. unionsq
3.2 RNT for Many-Round Protocols
Let us prove Theorem 1 as a consequence of Theorem 2.
Proof (Proof of Theorem 1) Let c be the constant hidden in O-notation in Theorem 2
so that every one round private-coin -discrete protocol π with |X |, |Y| ≤ 2n can be
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converted into one round public-coin protocol π ′ generating the same distribution on
transcripts with
IC(π ′) ≤ IC(π) + c log 2n.
We are given a q-round private-coin protocol ρ and will simulate it by a public-coin
protocol ρ′ with
IC(ρ′) ≤ IC(ρ) + 2qc log 2n.
The transformation of ρ into ρ′ is as one can expect: in each node v of the protocol
tree ρ we use a permutation of messages that depends on the input of the player
communicating in that node. More specifically, let m< j denote the concatenation of
messages sent by ρ′ up to round j . In j th round of ρ′ we apply the protocol ρ′m< j ,
which is obtained by the transformation of Theorem 2 from the 1-round sub-protocol
ρm< j of ρ rooted from the node m< j of the protocol tree of ρ. This change does
not affect the probability distribution over messages sent in each node and hence
the resulting protocol ρ′ generates exactly the same distribution on transcripts. The
protocol ρ′ uses the same randomness as ρ; however, unlike ρ it uses public and not
private randomness.
We have to relate now the information cost of ρ′ to that of ρ. To this end we split
the information cost of ρ′ into the sum of information costs of each round of ρ′.
Specifically, by the Chain rule (Fact 4) the amount of information revealed by ρ′ to
Bob (say) equals
I (X : M1, R1, . . . , Mq , Rq |Y ) =
∑
j
I (X : M j , R j |Y, M< j , R< j ).
where R j denotes randomness used in the j th round of ρ′ and M j = ρ′M< j (X, R j )
denotes the message sent in the j th round of ρ′.
From I (R< j : M j , R j |Y, M< j ) = 0, we conclude from Theorem 2—using Facts 5
and 6 from the preliminaries—that
I (X : M j , R j |Y, M< j , R< j ) ≤ I (X : M j , R j |Y, M< j )
≤ I (X : M j |Y, M< j ) + c log 2n,
where I (X : M j |Y, M< j ) in the right hand side is the information cost of j th round
of the original protocol ρ. Summing up this inequality over all j = 1, . . . , q and
applying the Chain rule to ρ we see that
I (X : M1, R1, . . . , Mq , Rq |Y ) ≤ I (X : M1, . . . , Mq |Y ) + qc log 2n.
The similar inequality for the amount of information revealed by ρ and ρ′ to Alice is
proved in a similar way. unionsq
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4 Compression for Public-Coin Protocols
We present in this section two results of the following general form: we will take a
public-coin protocol π that reveals little information, and “compress” it into a protocol
ρ that uses little communication to perform the same task with about the same error
probability. It turns out that the results in this setting are simpler and give stronger
compression than in the case where Alice and Bob have private randomness (such
as in [1,6]). We present two bounds, one that is dependent on the number of rounds
of π , but which is also round-efficient, in the sense that ρ will not use many more
rounds than π ; and one that is independent of the number of rounds of π , but where
the compression is not as good when the number of rounds of π is small. We begin
with the latter.
Theorem 3 Suppose there exists a public-coin protocol π to compute f : {0, 1}n ×
{0, 1}n → Z over the distribution μ with error probability δ′, and let C = CC(π),
I = ICμ(π). Then for any positive δ there is a public-coin protocol ρ computing f
over μ with error δ′ + δ, and with ACCμ(ρ) = O(I · log(2Cn/δ)).
Proof Our compression scheme is similar, but not identical, to that of [1]—the absence
of private randomness allows for a more elementary proof.
It suffices to prove the theoremonly for deterministic protocols—the case for public-
coin protocols can be proved as follows. By fixing any outcome r of randomness R of
a public-coin protocol π , we obtain a protocol πr without public randomness and can
apply Theorem 3 to πr . The average communication length of the resulting determin-
istic protocol ρr is at most O(I (πr ) · log(2Cn/δ)). Thus the average communication
of the public-coin protocol ρ that chooses a random r and runs ρr will be at most
O(I · log(2Cn/δ)).
Thus we have to show that any deterministic protocol π can be simulated with
communication roughly:
I (Y : Π |X) + I (X : Π |Y ) = H(Π |X) + H(Π |Y )
(the equality follows because H(Π |X, Y ) = 0, since the transcript Π is a function of
X and Y ). As we do not relate the round complexity of ρ to that of π in this theorem,
we may assume that in the protocol π every message is just a bit (and the turn to
communicate does not necessarily alternate). In other words, the protocol tree has
binary branching.
Given her input x , Alice knows the distribution ofΠ |x , and she can hence compute
the conditional probability Pr[π(X, Y ) = t |X = x] for each leaf t of the protocol
tree. We will use the notation wa(t |x) for this conditional probability. Likewise Bob
computes wb(t |y) = Pr[π(X, Y ) = t |Y = y]. Now it must hold that π(x, y) is the
unique leaf such that bothwa(t |x), wb(t |y) are positive. Alice andBob then proceed in
stages to find that leaf: at a given stage they have agreed that a certain partial transcript,
which is a node in the protocol tree of π , is a prefix of π(x, y). Then each of them
chooses a candidate transcript, which is a leaf extending their partial transcript (the
candidate transcripts of Alice and Bob may be different). Then they find the largest
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common prefix (lcp) of their two candidate transcripts, i.e., find the first bit at which
their candidate transcripts disagree. Now, because one of the players actually knows
what that bit should be (that bit depends either on x or on y), the player who got it
wrong can change her/his bit to its correct value, and this will give the new partial
transcripts they agree upon. They proceed this way until they both know π(x, y).
It will be seen that the candidate leaf can be chosen in such a way that the total
probability mass under the nodes they have agreed upon halves at every correction,
and this will be enough to show that Alice will only need to correct her candidate
transcript H(Π |X) times (and Bob H(Π |Y ) times) on average. Efficient protocols
for finding the lcp of two strings will then give us the required bounds.
We first construct an interactive protocol that makes use of a special device, which
we call lcp box. This is a conceptual interactive device with the following behavior:
Alice takes a string u and puts it in the lcp box, Bob takes a string v and puts it in the
lcp box, then a button is pressed, and Alice and Bob both learn the largest common
prefix of u and v. Using an lcp box will allow us to ignore error events until the very
end of the proof, avoiding an annoying technicality that offers no additional insight.
Lemma 3 For any given probability distribution μ over input pairs and for every
deterministic protocol π with information cost I (w.r.t. μ) and worst case communi-
cation C there is a deterministic protocol ρ˜ with zero communication computing the
same function with the same error probability (w.r.t. μ) as π , and using lcp box for
C-bitstrings at most I times on average (w.r.t. μ).
Proof On inputs x and y, in the new protocol ρ˜ Alice and Bob compute weights
wa(t |x), wb(t |y) of every leaf of the protocol tree of π , as explained above. Further-
more, for every binary string s let wa(s|x) denote the sum of weights wa(t |x) over all
leaves t under s. Define wb(s|y) in a similar way.
The protocol ρ˜ runs in stages: before each stage i Alice and Bob have agreed on a
binary string s = si−1, which is a prefix of π(x, y). Initially s = s0 is empty.
On stage i Alice defines the candidate transcript ta as follows: she appends 0 to
s = si−1 if wa(s0|x) > wa(s1|x) and she appends 1 to s otherwise. Let s′ denote
the resulting string. Again, she appends 0 to s′ if wa(s′0|x) > wa(s′1|x) and she
appends 1 to s′ otherwise. She proceeds in this way until she gets a leaf of the tree (by
construction its weight is positive). Bob defines his candidate transcript tb in a similar
way. Then they put ta and tb in the lcp box and they learn the largest common prefix
s∗ of ta and tb. By construction both wa(s∗|x) and wb(s∗|y) are positive and hence
s∗ is a prefix of π(x, y).6 Recall that no leaf of the protocol tree is a prefix of another
leaf. Therefore either s∗ = ta = tb, in which case they stop the protocol, as they both
know π(x, y). Or s∗ is a proper prefix of both ta and tb. If the node s∗ of the protocol
tree belongs to Alice, then Bob’s next bit is incorrect, and otherwise Alice’s next bit
is incorrect. They both add the correct bit to s∗ and let si be the resulting string.
Each timeAlice’s bit is incorrectwa(s|x) decreases by a factor of 1/2, and similarly
each time Bob’s bit is incorrect wb(s|y) decreases by a factor of 1/2. At the start we
6 This follows because π is a protocol. Indeed, if s∗ were not a prefix of π(x, y), that would mean some
bit in s∗ is the wrong bit send by one of the players. If it is a wrong bit for Alice, then wa(s∗|x) = 0, and
similarly for Bob.
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have wa(s|x) = wb(s|y) = 1 and at the end we have wa(s|x) = wa(π(x, y)|x) and
wb(s|y) = wb(π(x, y)|y). Hence they use the lcp box at most
log 1/wa(π(x, y)|x) + log 1/wb(π(x, y)|y)
times. By definition of the conditional entropy the average of log 1/wa(π(X, Y )|X)
is equal to H(Π |X) and the average of log 1/wb(π(X, Y )|Y ) equals H(Π |Y ). Thus
Alice and Bob use lcp box at most I times on average. unionsq
Now we have to transform the protocol of Lemma 3 to a randomized public-coin
protocol computing f that does not use an lcp box, with additional error δ. The use of
an lcp box can be simulated with an error-prone implementation:
Lemma 4 ([10]) For every positive ε and every natural C there is a randomized
public-coin protocol such that on input two C-bit strings x, y, it outputs the largest
common prefix of x, y with probability at least 1 − ε; its worst-case communication
complexity is O(log(C/ε)).
The lemma is proven by hashing (as in the randomized protocol for equality) and
binary search. From this lemma we obtain the following corollary.
Lemma 5 For every positive δ any protocol ρ˜ to compute f : {0, 1}n × {0, 1}n → Z
that uses an lcp box  ≤ 2n times on average for strings of length at most C can be
simulated with error δ by a protocol ρ that does not use an lcp box, and communicates
O( log( 2Cn
δ
)) bits more on average.7
Proof The protocolρ simulates ρ˜ by replacing each use of the lcp boxwith the protocol
given by Lemma 4 with some error parameter ε (to be specified later). The simulation
continues while the total communication is less than n. Once it becomes n, we stop
the simulation and both players exchange their inputs.
Notice that the additional error probability introduced by the failure of the protocol
of Lemma 4 is at most ε: for each input pair (x, y) the error probability is at most
εi(x, y), where i(x, y) stands for the number of times we invoke lcp box for that
particular pair, and the average of εi(x, y) over (x, y) equals ε. Thus if we take
ε ≤ δ/, the error probability introduced by failures of the lcp box is at most δ.
Each call of lcp box costs O(log(C/ε). Thus the communication of ρ is at most
O( log(C/ε)) + (ε)(3n)
more on average than that of ρ˜. Here the first term is an upper bound for the average
communication over all triples (x, y, randomness for lcp box) such that no lcp failure
occurs and the second term accounts for the communication over all remaining triples.
Let ε = δ/2n (which is less than δ/, as we assume that  ≤ 2n) so that the average
communication is at most O( log( 2Cn
δ
) + δ) = O( log( 2Cn
δ
)).
We are now able to finish the proof of Theorem 3. Notice that the information cost
of the initial protocol is at most 2n. Hence we can apply Lemma 5 for  = I to the
7 The averages are measured over the input distribution and the internal randomness of the protocol.
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protocol of Lemma 3. The average communication of the resulting protocol ρ is at
most O(I · log(2Cn/δ)). unionsq
The proof of Theorem 3 offers no guarantee on the number of rounds of the
compressed protocol ρ. It is possible to compress a public-coin protocol on a round-
by-round basis while preserving, up to a multiplicative constant, the total number of
rounds used.
Theorem 4 Suppose there exists a public-coin protocol π to compute f : {0, 1}n ×
{0, 1}n → Z over input distribution μ with error probability δ′, and let I = ICμ(π)
and q = RC(π). Then for every positive δ there exists a public-coin protocol ρ that
computes f over μ with error δ′ + δ, and with ACCμ(ρ) = O(I + 1) + q log(nq/δ)
and ARCμ(ρ) = O(q).
Proof Again it suffices to prove the theorem for deterministic protocols π . The idea
of the proof is to show the result one round at a time. In round i , Alice, say, must
send a certain message mi to Bob. From Bob’s point of view, this message is drawn
according to the random variable Mi = Mi (X˜ , y, m1, . . . , mi−1) where X˜ is Alice’s
input conditioned on Bob’s input being y and on the messages m1, . . . , mi−1 that were
previously exchanged. We will show that there is a sub-protocol σi that can simulate
round i with small error by using constantly-many rounds and with
O(H(Mi |y, m1, . . . , mi−1)) = O(I (X : Mi |y, m1, . . . , mi−1))
bits of communication on average. Then putting these sub-protocols together, and
truncating the resulting protocol whenever the communication is excessive, we obtain
the protocol ρ which simulates π . unionsq
The procedure to compress each round is achieved through an interactive variant of
the Slepian–Wolf theorem [4,18,19].We could not apply the known theorems directly,
however, since they were made to work in different settings.
In a similar fashion to the proof of Theorem 3, we will make use of a special
interactive device, which we call a transmission μ-box, where μ is a probability
distribution over input pairs (X, Y ). Its behavior is as follows: one player takes a
string x and puts it in the transmission box, the other player takes a string y and puts
it in the box, a button is pressed, and then the second player knows x . The usage of a
transmission μ-box is charged in such a way that the average cost when the input pair
(X, Y ) is drawn at randomwith respect toμ is O(H(X |Y )+1) bits of communication
and O(1) rounds.
Lemma 6 Let π be any deterministic q-round protocol, and let μ be the distribution
of the inputs (X, Y ). Then there exists a deterministic protocol ρ˜ that makes use of
the transmission box (each time for a different distribution) to achieve the following
properties.
1. The average communication of ρ˜ is ACCμ(ρ˜) = O(ICμ(π) + q);
2. The average number of rounds of ρ˜ is ARCμ(ρ˜) = O(q);
3. ρ˜ uses a transmission box q times; and
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4. After ρ˜ is run on the inputs x, y, both players know π(x, y).
Proof Let π< j (x, y) denote the sequence of messages sent by π in the first j − 1
rounds for inputs x, y. The protocol ρ˜ simulates π on a round-per-round basis.
Assume that in the new protocol j − 1 rounds were played. Let m< j denote the
sequence of j − 1 messages sent earlier and let x, y stand for inputs. Assume further
that in j th round of π Alice has to communicate. Her message is a function M of
the sequence m< j and her input x . Let ν denote the probability distribution on pairs
(m, y) where
ν(m, y) = Pr[M(X, m< j ) = m, Y = y|π< j (X, Y ) = m< j ].
In round j of protocol ρ˜, Alice puts the string M(x, m< j ) into the transmission ν-
box and Bob puts his input y there and they press the button. If it is Bob’s turn to
communicate, then they reverse their positions.
Items 2, 3 and 4 from the statement of the Lemma follow from construction of
ρ˜ and from the description of the transmission box. It remains to bound the average
communication length of ρ˜. Again by assumption on transmission box, the average
communication in round j is at most O(I j + 1) where
I j = H(M(X, π< j (X, Y ))|Y, π< j (X, Y )),
if it is Alice’s turn to communicate and
I j = H(M(Y, π< j (X, Y ))|X, π< j (X, Y )),
otherwise. From the chain rule (Fact 4) it follows that the sum of I j over all j of the
first type is equal to I (Π : X |Y ), while that the sum of I j over all j of the second
type is equal to I (Π : Y |X). unionsq
To proceed we need a protocol simulating the transmission box.
Lemma 7 (Constant-round average-case one-shot Slepian–Wolf) Let μ be the distri-
bution of the inputs (X, Y ). For every positive ε there is a public-coin communication
protocol with the following properties:
1. For all fixed x, y, after execution of the protocol Bob learns x with probability at
least 1 − ε.
2. When (X, Y ) are drawn according to μ, the protocol communicates
O(H(X |Y ) + 1) + log(1/ε)
bits in O(1) rounds on average.
Contrast this to the classical Slepian–Wolf theorem, where Alice and Bob are given
a stream of i.i.d. pairs (X1, Y1), . . . , (Xn, Yn), and Alice gets to transmit X1, . . . , Xn
by using only one-way communication, and with an amortized communication of
H(X |Y ).
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Proof Let y beBob’s given input. For a given x in the support of X , let p(x) = Pr[X =
x |Y = y], and for a given subsetX of the same support, let p(X ) = Pr[X ∈ X |Y = y].
Then Bob begins by arranging the x’s in the support of X by decreasing order of the
probability p(x). He then defines the two sets
X1 = {x1, . . . , xi(1)}, Z1 = X1,
where i(1) is the minimal index which makes p(X1) ≥ 1/2. Inductively, while Zk
does not contain the entire support of X , he then defines:
Xk+1 = {xi(k)+1, · · · , xi(k+1)}, Zk+1 = Zk ∪ Xk+1,
where i(k + 1) > i(k) is the minimal index which makes p(Xk+1) ≥ 1−p(Zk )2 .
I.e. Xk+1 is the smallest set which takes the remaining highest-probability x’s so that
they total at least half of the remaining probability mass.
Because at least one new xi is added at every step, this inductive procedure gives
Bob a finite number of sets Z1, . . . ,ZK = X . Then the protocol consists of applying
the protocol of the following lemma, which will be proved later.
Lemma 8 For every natural m and every positive ε there exists a randomized public-
coin protocol with the following behavior. Suppose that Bob is given a family of finite
sets Z1 ⊆ · · · ⊆ ZK ⊂ {0, 1}m and Alice is given a string z ∈ ZK . Then the protocol
transmits z to Bob, except with a failure probability of at most ε. For k the smallest
index for which z ∈ Zk , the run of this protocol uses at most 2k + 1 rounds and
2 log |Zk | + log 1ε + 4k bits of communication.
Now let us bound the average number of rounds and communication complexity.
First notice that p(Xk) ≤ 21−k , and hence, taking the average over Alice’s inputs, we
find that
K∑
k=1
p(Xk)4k = O(1)
must upper bound the average number of rounds, as well as the contribution of the 4k
term to the average communication. To upper-bound the contribution of the 2 log |Zk |
term, we first settle that:
(i) p(Xk) ≤ 2p(Xk+1)+2p(xi(k)), which can be seen by summing two inequalities
that follow from the minimality of i(k) in the definition of Xk :
p(Xk) − p(xi(k)) ≤ 1 − p(Zk−1)2 ,
1 − p(Zk)
2
≤ p(Xk+1),
after which we get
p(Xk)
2
− p(xi(k)) ≤ p(Xk+1).
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(ii) |Zk | ≤ 1p(x) for any x ∈ Xk+1 ∪ {xi(k)}, which follows since every x ′ ∈ Zk has a
higher-or-equal probability than the x’s in Xk+1 ∪ {xi(k)}, but the sum of all the
p(x ′) still adds up to less than 1.
Now we are ready to bound the remaining term in the average communication:
K∑
k=1
p(Xk) log |Zk | ≤ 2
K−1∑
k=1
p(Xk+1) log |Zk | + p(XK ) log |ZK |
+ 2
K∑
k=1
p(xi(k)) log |Zk | ≤ 5
∑
x
p(x) log
1
p(x)
= O(H(X |Y = y));
above, the first inequality follows from (i), and the second from (ii). unionsq
Proof of Lemma 8 The protocol is divided into stages and works as follows. On the
first stage, Bob begins by sending the number 1 = log |Z1| in unary to Alice,
and Alice responds by picking L1 = 1 + log 1ε + 1 random linear functions
f (1)1 , . . . , f
(1)
L1
: Zm2 → Z2 using public randomness, and sending Bob the hash values
f (1)1 (z), . . . , f
(1)
L1
(z). Bob then looks for a string z′ ∈ Z1 that has the same hash values
he just received; if there is such a string, then Bob says so, and the protocol is finished
with Bob assuming that z′ = z.
Otherwise, the protocol continues. At stage k, Bob computes the number k =
log |Zk |, and sends the number k −k−1 in unary to Alice; Alice responds by picking
Lk = k − k−1 + 1 random linear functions f (k)1 , . . . , f (k)Lk , whose evaluation on z
she sends over to Bob. Bob then looks for a string z′ ∈ Zk that has the same hash
values for all the hash functions which were picked in this and previous stages; if there
is such a string, then Bob says so, and the protocol is finished with Bob assuming that
z′ = z. If the protocol has not halted in K rounds, Alice just sends her input to Bob.
An error will occur whenever a z′ = z is found that has the same fingerprint as
z. The probability that this happens at stage k for a specific z′ ∈ Zk is 2−L , where
L = k + k + log 1ε is the total number of hash functions picked up to this stage. By a
union bound, the probability that such a z′ exists is at most |Zk |2−k ε2k ≤ ε2k . Again
by a union bound, summing over all stages k we get a total error probability of ε.
To bound the communication for z ∈ Zk , notice that sending all 1. . . . , k costs
Bob at most log |Zk | + k bits of total communication,8 that the total number of hash
values sent by Alice is at most log |Zk | + 2k + log 1ε , and that Bob’s reply (saying
whether the protocol should continue) costs him k bits. unionsq
From Lemma 7 we get an analogue of Lemma 5.
Lemma 9 For every positive δ ≤ 1/3 any protocol ρ˜ to compute f : {0, 1}n ×
{0, 1}n → Z that uses transmission boxes q times can be simulated with error δ by
a protocol ρ that does not use transmission boxes, and communicates q log( qn
δ
) + 1
bits more.
8 We have added 1 bit per message because, sending i ones to Alice, Bob should append them by a
zero—recall that the messages must form a prefix free set.
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Proof The protocol ρ simulates ρ˜ by replacing each use of a transmission box with
the protocol given by Lemma 7with some error parameter ε (to be specified later). The
simulation continues while the total communication is less than n. Once it becomes
n, we stop the simulation and the players exchange their inputs.
The additional error probability introduced by the failure of the protocol of Lemma
7 is at most qε. Assuming that ε ≤ δ/q, the error probability introduced by a trans-
mission box failure is at most δ.
Each call of a transmission box costs log(1/ε) bits of communication more than
we have charged the protocol ρ˜. Thus the communication of ρ is at most
q log(1/ε) + (qε)(2n)
longer than that of ρ˜. Set ε = δ/qn, so that the communication of ρ is at most
q log(qn/δ) + 2δ ≤ q log(qn/δ) + 1
more than that of ρ˜.
The desired protocol that establishes Theorem 4 is obtained by applying Lemma 9
to the protocol of Lemma 6. unionsq
5 Applications
From the combination of Theorems 1 and 4, and Observation 1, we can obtain a new
compression result for general protocols.
Corollary 1 Suppose there exists a mixed-coin, q-round protocol π to compute f over
the input distribution μ with error probability ε, and let C = CC(π), I = ICμ(π),
n = log |X | + log |Y|. Then there exists a public-coin, O(q)-average-round protocol
ρ that computes f over μ with error ε + δ, and with
ACCμ(ρ) ≤ O
(
I + q log
(
qnC
δ
))
. (3)
As we will see in the following sub-section, this will result in a new direct-sum
theorem for bounded-round protocols. In general, given that we have already proven
Theorem 3, and given that this approach shows promise in the bounded-round case,
it becomes worthwhile to investigate whether we can prove Conjecture 1 with similar
techniques.
5.1 Direct-Sum Theorems for the Bounded-Round Case
The following theorem was proven in [1]:
Theorem 5 ([1], Theorem 12) Suppose that there is a q-round protocol πk that com-
putes k copies of f with communication complexity C and error ε, over the k-fold
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distribution μk . Then there exists a q-round mixed-coin protocol π that computes a
single copy of f with communication complexity C and the same error probability ε,
but with information cost ICμ(π) ≤ 2Ck for any input distribution μ.
As a consequence of this theorem, and of Corollary 1, we will be able to prove a
direct-sum theorem. The proof is a simple application of Theorem 5, and Corollary 1.
Theorem 6 (Direct-sum theorem for the bounded-round case) There is some constant
d such that, for any input distribution μ and any 0 < ε < δ < 1, if f requires, on
average,
C + q log
(
qnC
δ − ε
)
bits of communication to be computed over μ with error δ in dq (average) rounds,
then f ⊗k requires kC bits of communication, in the worst case, to be computed over
μ⊗k with error ε in q rounds.
5.2 Comparison with Previous Results
We may compare Corollary 1 with the results of [6]. In that paper, the nC factor is
missing inside the log of equation (3), but the number of rounds of the compressed
protocol is O(q log I ) instead of O(q). A similar difference appears in the resulting
direct-sum theorems.
We remark that the compression of Jain et al. [12] is also achieved with a round-
by-round proof. Our direct-sum theorem is incomparable with their more ambitious
direct-product result. It is no surprise, then, that the communication complexity of their
compression scheme is O( q I
δ
), i.e., it incurs a factor of q, whereas we pay only an
additive term of O˜(q). However, their direct-product result also preserves the number
of rounds in the protocol, whereas in our result the number of rounds is only preserved
within a constant factor.
6 Alternative Constructions and Matching Lower Bounds
6.1 A Different Upper Bound on the Degree of Matching Graphs
Lemma 10 For all integer  ≤ m and positive δ there is an (m, , d, δ)-matching
graph with d = (2 + (m − ) ln 2)/δ2 + ln(1/δ)/δ.
Proof We show the existence of such a graph using a probabilistic argument. Let A
and B be any sets of M = 2m left and L = 2 right nodes, respectively. Construct
a random graph G by choosing d random neighbors independently for each u ∈ A.
Different neighbors of the same node u are also chosen independently, thus they might
coincide. For any A′ ⊆ A of size L , let E A′ be the event that G A′∪B does not have
a matching of size L(1 − δ), and let BAD := ∨A′ E A′ . Note that the lemma holds if
Pr[BAD] < 1.
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Next, we bound Pr[E A′ ]. Let A′ = {u1, . . . , uL} be any set of L left nodes. Let
N (u) denote the neighborhood of a vertex u. Consider the following procedure for
generating a matching for G A′∪B :
Find- Matching
1 Matching ← ∅
2 V ← ∅
3 for i ← 1 to L
4 if N (ui )  V
5 pick arbitrary vi ∈ N (ui ) \ V
6 Matching ← Matching ∪ {(ui , vi )}
7 V ← V ∪ {vi }
8 return Matching
Define the indicator variables X1, . . . , X L as follows: Xi = 1 if the the condition
in the 4th line of Find-Matching is true and 0 otherwise. From the definition of these
variables it follows that for all i and all b = (b1, . . . , bi ) ∈ {0, 1}i the conditional
probability of Xi+1 = 0 given X1 = b1, . . . , Xi = bi is equal to
(|b|/L)d ,
where |b| stands for Hamming weight of vector b, i.e. the number of 1s in b =
(b1, . . . , bi ). Consider also similar randomvariablesY1, . . . , YL where the distribution
of Y1, . . . , YL is defined by the formula
Pr[Yi+1 = 0|Y1 = b1, . . . , Yi = bi ] =
{
(|b|/L)d , if |b| < (1 − δ)L ,
1, if |b| ≥ (1 − δ)L .
In terms of X1, . . . , X L the event E A′ happens if and only if X1 + · · · + X L <
(1 − δ)L . For every string b of Hamming weight less than (1 − δ)L the probabilities
Pr[X = b] and Pr[Y = b] coincide. Thus it suffices to upper bound the probability
Pr[Y1 + · · · + YL < (1 − δ)L]. To this end consider independent random variables
Z1, . . . , ZL ∈ {0, 1}, where the probability of Zi = 1 is (1 − δ)d .
Claim Pr[|Y | < (1 − δ)L] ≤ Pr[|Z | < (1 − δ)L].
Proof We prove this using the coupling method. We claim that there is a joint distri-
bution of Y and Z such that the marginal distributions are as defined above, and with
probability 1 it holds that Zi ≤ Yi for all i . This joint distribution is defined by the
following process: we pick L independent reals r1, . . . , rL ∈ [0; 1] and let
Zi =
{
0, if ri < (1 − δ)d;
1, otherwise.
Yi =
⎧
⎨
⎩
0, if ri <
(
Y1+···+Yi−1
L
)d
and Y1+···+Yi−1L < 1 − δ;
1, otherwise.
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We claim that the inequality Zi ≤ Yi (holding with probability 1) implies that for for
every downward closed set E ⊂ {0, 1} it holds Pr[Y ∈ E] ≤ Pr[Z ∈ E] (we call a set
E downward closed if b ∈ E and b′ ≤ b, component-wise, implies b′ ∈ E). Indeed,
Pr[Y ∈ E] ≤ Pr[Y ∈ E, Z ∈ E] ≤ Pr[Z ∈ E],
where the first inequality holds, since E is downward closed and thus Y ∈ E implies
Z ∈ E . The set of Boolean vectors b ∈ {0, 1}L of Hamming weight less than (1− δ)L
is downward closed hence the statement. unionsq
By this lemma it suffices to upper bound the probability
Pr[Z1 + · · · + ZL < (1 − δ)L],
which can be obtained by Chernoff bound.
Let S := ∑(1 − Zi ), and let μ := E[S], p = (1 − δ)d . Note that μ = pL . Also,
let ψ := δ/p − 1. Using the multiplicative version of the Chernoff bound, we have
Pr[S > δL] = Pr[S > pL · (δ/p)]
= Pr[S > μ(1 + ψ)]
<
(
eψ
(1 + ψ)(1+ψ)
)μ
= exp
(
μ
(
δ
p
− 1 − δ
p
ln
(
δ
p
)))
< exp
(
μ
(
δ
p
− δ
p
ln
(
δ
p
)))
= exp
(
pL
δ
p
(1 − ln δ + ln p)
)
= exp (δL + δL ln(1/δ) + δL ln p)
= exp (δL (1 + ln(1/δ) + ln p)) .
Thus for every set A′ of L left nodes we have Pr[E A′ ] < eδL(1+ln(1/δ)+ln p). There
are
(M
L
)
subsets of A of size L . By Stirling’s formula, we have
(
M
L
)
≤ (M)
L
L! ≤
(
Me
L
)L
= exp(L(1 + ln M/L)).
By union bound we have
Pr[BAD] ≤ exp (M(1 + ln M/L)) · exp (δM(1 + ln(1/δ) + ln p))
= exp (M + M ln M/L + δM + δM ln(1/δ) + δM ln p)
< exp
(
M + M ln M/L + δM + δM ln(1/δ) − dδ2M
)
< 1,
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where the final inequality uses d = (2 + ln M/L)/δ2 + ln(1/δ)/δ. unionsq
6.2 A Lower Bound on the Degree of Matching Graphs
Lemma 11 An (m, , d, δ)-matching graph must have
d = Ω
(
min
(
m − 
δ
, δ2
))
.
Proof We will prove that in such a bipartite graph there must exist a left-set A of size
2m(1− 4δ)d whose neighbors are contained in a right-set B of size (1− 2δ)2. If the
graph is a matching graph with said parameters, it must then follow that |A| ≤ 2,
hence d ≥ (m − )/ log(1 − 4δ) = Ω((m − )/δ).
We show this through the probabilistic method. Let us pick a random right-set B
of size (1 − 2δ)2. For a given left-node a, the probability that all its neighbors fall
into B is at least
(
2 − d
(1 − 2δ)2 − d
)/( 2
(1 − 2δ)2
)
≥ (1 − 2δ)d
(
1 − 2d
2
)d
.
Under the assumption that d ≤ δ2, the left-hand side is at least (1 − 4δ)d .
It must then hold that for such random B, the expected number of left-nodes that
map into B is 2m(1 − 4δ). Hence, for some choice of B, there will exist a left-set A
of the same size whose neighbors are all in B. unionsq
6.3 A Lower Bound for Eq. (2) of the Proof of Lemma 2
Lemma 12 There is an -discrete private-coin one-way protocol π , and a message
m sent by π , such that for J defined as in Lemma 2, it holds that
I (J : X |Mπ = m) = Ω(log ).
Proof Suppose Alice is given an input X uniformly distributed over {x1, . . . , xN }, and
private randomness uniformly distributed over {r1, . . . , rN }, so that  = log N . Let π
be a one-way protocol given by
Mπ (x j , rk) =
{
0 if k ≤
⌊
N
j+1
⌋
,
1 otherwise.
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Then conditioned on Mπ = 0, we will have J (x j , rk) = k. Let M = ∑Ni=1 Ni+1 be
the size of M−1π (0). Finally, let m denote the event Mπ = 0. Then
I (X : J |m) = H(X |m) − H(X |m, J )
=
N∑
j=1
1
M
·
⌊
N
j + 1
⌋
log
M
⌊
N
j+1
⌋ −
N∑
k=1
1
M
·
⌊
N
k + 1
⌋
log
⌊
N
k + 1
⌋
= log M − 2
M
N∑
i=1
⌊
N
i + 1
⌋
log
⌊
N
i + 1
⌋
,
which is ≥ U if and only if:
2
N∑
i=1
⌊
N
i + 1
⌋
log
⌊
N
i + 1
⌋
≤ M(log M − U ). (4)
Let us denote the left-hand side with A and the right-hand side with B. Because Nx is
monotonically decreasing for x ≥ 1, then:
A ≤ 2
ln 2
∫ N+1
1
N
x
ln
N
x
dx .
The relevant primitive is
∫ N
x ln
N
x dx = − 12 N (ln Nx )2 and hence
A ≤ 2
ln 2
(
−1
2
N
(
ln
N
N + 1
)2
+ 1
2
N (ln N )2
)
= 2
ln 2
(
N ln N ln(N + 1) − 1
2
N (ln(N + 1))2
)
.
We denote this last quantity by A′. Good bounds for M are:9
N ln N − 3N ≤ M =
N∑
i=1
⌊
N
i + 1
⌋
≤ N ln N + N .
Let B ′ := N ln N − 3N , so that B ≥ B ′(log B ′ − U ). Then we will show that for an
appropriate choice of U ,
A′ ≤ B ′(log B ′ − U )
9 This is because the harmonic numbers Hn = ∑ni=1 1/ i converge to log N +γ for the Euler–Mascheroni
constant γ ≈ 0.577.
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and hence A ≤ B and also I (X : J |m) ≥ U . Equivalently,
A′ − B ′ log B ′ + B ′U ≤ 0 (5)
For convenience, let α = ln(N+1)ln N (which goes to 1 as N goes to ∞). Then
A′ = 1ln 2 N (ln N )2(2α − α2) and B ′ log B ′ = 1ln 2 N (ln N )2 + 1ln 2 N ln N ln ln N +
O(N ln N ). Now the proof follows from the following:
Claim N (ln N )2(2α − α2 − 1) → − 1N as N → ∞.
Because under this claim, the dominant negative term in (5) is 1ln 2 N ln N ln ln N ,
and thus all we need to do is set U to be c ln ln N for some c < 1ln 2 , and this ensures
(5) is negative. For such a choice of U , it will hold that
I (X : J |m) ≥ U = c ln ln N = Ω(log ).
Unfortunately, l’Hopital’s rule does not seem to help us, as the terms become too
complicated. Instead we estimate how fast (2α − α2 − 1) approaches 0 as N goes to
infinity. For this, let β = ln( 1x +1)
ln 1x
and let us estimate β as x approaches 0. For x close
to, but different than, 0, we have:
β = 1 − 1
ln x
ln(x + 1) = 1 − x
ln x
+ x
2
2 ln x
± O
(
x3
ln x
)
(the last equality is by the Taylor expansion of ln(x + 1) around 0). We also have
β2 =
(
1 − x
ln x
+ x
2
2 ln x
− O
(
x3
ln x
))2
= β − x
ln x
+ x
2
(ln x)2
+ x
2
2 ln x
± O
(
x3
(ln x)2
)
.
Hence,
2β − β2 = 1 − x
2
(ln x)2
± O
(
x3
(ln x)2
)
.
From this we can conclude that for x = 1/N , we have
2α − α2 − 1 = − 1
N 2(ln N )2
± O
(
1
N 3(ln N )2
)
,
and our claim follows. unionsq
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